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Abstract
SRAM-based FPGAs are popular in the aerospace industry for their field
programmability and low cost. However, they suffer from cosmic radiation-
induced Single Event Upsets (SEUs). Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
is a well-known technique to mitigate SEUs in FPGAs that is often used
with another SEU mitigation technique known as configuration scrubbing.
Traditional TMR provides protection against a single fault at a time, while
partitioned TMR provides improved reliability and availability. In this paper,
we present a methodology to analyze TMR partitioning at early design stage
using probabilistic model checking. The proposed formal model can capture
both single and multiple-cell upset scenarios, regardless of any assumption
of equal partition sizes. Starting with a high-level description of a design,
a Markov model is constructed from the Data Flow Graph (DFG) using a
specified number of partitions, a component characterization library and a
user defined scrub rate. Such a model and exhaustive analysis captures all
the considered failures and repairs possible in the system within the radiation
environment. Various reliability and availability properties are then verified
automatically using the PRISM model checker exploring the relationship
between the scrub frequency and the number of TMR partitions required to
meet the design requirements. Also, the reported results show that based
on a known voter failure rate, it is possible to find an optimal number of
∗Corresponding author
Email address: hoquek@missouri.edu (Khaza Anuarul Hoque)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier October 9, 2019
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
04
88
6v
3 
 [c
s.D
C]
  8
 O
ct 
20
19
partitions at early design stages using our proposed method.
Keywords: SEU, TMR, probabilistic model checking, SRAM-based FPGA.
1. Introduction
Field programmability, low manufacturing cost, and other advantages
make SRAM-based FPGAs an attractive option compared to ASICs for space
applications. Unfortunately, the main disadvantage of these devices is their
sensitivity to cosmic radiation effects commonly known as Single Event Up-
sets (SEUs) [1]. SEUs occur when one or more bits in configuration memory
change state due to a radiation event. If only one bit in the configuration
memory is affected, then it is called a Single-Bit Upset (SBU). A Single-Cell
Upset (SCU) is defined as an event that induces a single-bit upset at a time.
If more than one bit is affected at a time in multiple storage locations, the
event is known as a Multiple-Cell Upset (MCU). Since the FPGA configu-
ration bits are stored in volatile SRAMs, SEUs are a major concern for the
successful operation of safety-critical systems. To deal with SEUs, designers
mostly rely on redundancy-based solutions, such as Triple Modular Redun-
dancy (TMR) [2] and configuration memory (Configuration Bits) scrubbing
[3]. TMR is a well-known technique for fault mitigation in which three redun-
dant copies of the same logic perform the same task in parallel. A majority
voter chooses the correct output from these three copies. Scrubbing uses a
background task that corrects the SEUs using error-correcting code memory
or a redundant copy of data, either periodically or on detection of an SEU.
Reliability analysis of TMR and their related improvements have been
studied for a long time and widely reported in the literature. By contrast,
partitioning of TMR for reliability improvement got less attention from the
research community. In [4], the authors present Markov models for par-
titioned TMR and showed how TMR partitioning can help improving the
reliability. In their models, the TMR partitions were assumed to be equal in
size. This assumption reduces the complexity of the model. However, this is
a clear limitation, because in a real design, it is not always possible or even
desired to have partitions of equal size. An optimal partitioning for TMR
logic was reported in [5] and the relationship between DCEs (Domain Cross-
ing Events) and the number of partitions was explored via fault injections.
Interestingly, a unified model that can quantify the effects of both SCU and
MCU at an early design stage is not reported to date. One of the goals of
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our work aims at overcoming these limitations.
Early analysis of availability and reliability impacts of SEUs on a design
can help designers developing more reliable and efficient systems while reduc-
ing the overall cost associated with their design. As spacecrafts are typically
constrained by strict power budgets, too frequent scrubbing will drain energy.
By contrast, less frequent scrubbing will allow accumulation of SEUs, which
will eventually break TMR tolerance. Thus, analyzing trade-offs between the
number of TMR partitions and scrub frequency is necessary. We propose a
methodology based on Probabilistic Model Checking, to analyze this rela-
tionship at early design stages while analyzing reliability and availability of
the design. Probabilistic model checking is a well known formal verification
technique, mainly based on the construction and analysis of a probabilistic
model, typically a Markov chain. The main advantage is that the analysis
is exhaustive, and therefore results in numerically exact answers to the tem-
poral logic queries, which contrasts discrete-event simulations [6]. Another
advantage of this technique is its ability to express detailed temporal con-
straints on system executions in contrast to analytical methods. It is worth
mentioning that formal verification is widely used in industry and govern-
ment research agencies including Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL),
NASA JPL, NASA Ames, NASA LaRC, National Institute of Aerospace
(NIA) and so on, for verification of safety-critical hardware and software
systems [7, 8, 9].
In our previous work [10, 11], we proposed a methodology that evaluates
a Markov reward model (constructed from its high-level description) against
performance-area-dependability tradeoffs using the PRISM model checker.
In brief, we showed that there are cases where rescheduling of a Data Flow
Graph (DFG) in conjunction with scrubbing can serve as a better fault-
tolerant mechanism when compared with another fault-tolerant mechanism
that combines the use of spare components with scrubbing. In addition, we
also explored the relationship between fault detection coverage and scrub-
bing intervals. In this paper, we use a similar technique to extract the DFG
from the high-level description of a system as explained in [11] in detail. The
main contribution of this paper is modeling of partitioned TMRs to explore
the relationships between the scrub frequency and the number of TMR par-
titions in early design stages. Our modeling and analysis exploit the formal
verification tool PRISM. This makes our work highly desirable since the use
of formal verification techniques (especially model checking) in system design
phases to verify the Design Assurance Level (DAL) compliance (as defined
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in the DO-254 standard [12] for airborne electronic hardware) is highly rec-
ommended by NASA and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [13]. Of
course, performing the analysis only at early stage is not sufficient. Later
in the design phases, hardware designers and radiation experts will need to
perform additional tests like fault injection and beam testing in nuclear re-
actors. However, an early analysis in the design phase, such as our proposed
approach, can reduce the overall design time, effort and cost. Hence we
argue that our proposed technique bridges the gap between FPGA design-
ers, radiation experts and applied computer science using formal verification
techniques.
In our proposed approach, starting from a high-level description of a de-
sign (that employs partitioned TMR), the system is first modeled using the
Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) formalism. For CTMC modeling,
we utilize the DFG of the system, the number of intended partitions, the
scrub rate, and the failure rates that are obtained from a component char-
acterization library. The model is then encoded using the PRISM modeling
language. Properties related to the system’s reliability and availability ex-
pressed using probabilistic temporal logic (in our case Continuous Stochastic
Logic (CSL) [14]) are then verified automatically using the PRISM model
checker [15], and the relationship between the scrub interval and the number
of TMR partitions is assessed. In summary, our contributions in this paper
are:
1. We propose formal models (using the CTMC formalism) of partitioned-
TMR systems irrespective of the partition size (equal/non-equal sized).
The proposed model captures both SCUs and MCUs. We limit our
model up to SCUs and Double-Cell Upsets (DCUs).
2. We propose a methodology for early trade-off assessment of TMR par-
titioning and periodic blind scrubbing. The proposed modeling tech-
nique is modular, which means each partition of the TMRed system
is first modeled as a separate CTMC and then composed in parallel
to a larger CTMC that models all the TMR partitions in the system.
Since the approach is modular, it is easily extendable to any number of
partitions1.
1However, large number of partitions may cause the well-known state-space explosion
problem for model checking tools, we discuss this issue in detail in section 5.4
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Figure 1: Sample unmitigated circuit
3. Our CTMC formalization of the TMR partitioning is then encoded
using the PRISM modeling language, and we utilize the Probabilistic
Model Checking technique using the PRISM tool to perform quantita-
tive assessments of an SCU prone, and an SCU and DCU prone FIR
filter. Our analysis shows that increasing the number of TMR parti-
tions also increases the design reliability and availability for the designs
that are prone to both SCUs and DCUs (in the case when the failure
of TMR voters are ignored). Moreover, the number of partitions also
has a direct relationship with the configuration memory scrubbing fre-
quency. Indeed such a relationship can be quantitatively analyzed at
early design stages based on the design requirements and constraints
using the proposed methodology.
4. We also show that based on some given failure rate of voters (in contrast
to the previous case where the failures of TMR voters were ignored), it
is possible to identify the optimal number of partitions that offers the
highest reliability. To our knowledge, this is the first unified model that
captures SCUs, DCUs and voter failures for optimal TMR partitioning
at early design stages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the related works in this area. Section 3 describes the background about
SEU mitigation techniques and probabilistic model checking. The proposed
methodology and modeling details are discussed in section 4, and in section
5, we present quantitative results obtained using our proposed methodology.
Section 6 concludes the paper with proposed future research directions.
2. TMR partitioning and Related works
Traditional TMRed design can deal with a single fault at a time. Thus,
faults in multiple redundant modules will break the TMR. For illustration,
Figure 1 shows a sample circuit (each box represents a module) and Fig-
ure 2 shows the TMR implementation of the sample circuit in the traditional
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way. While designing a system with traditional TMR, the components are
triplicated and a majority voter is placed at the output of the circuit. The
voter can provide correct outputs even if one of the branches (or domains)
of the TMR is faulty. Figure 3 shows the same system implemented with
partitioned TMR (as suggested in [4]). In terms of dependability, each par-
tition can be considered as a separate entity. This circuit will only fail if two
or more domains in the same partition are affected by one or more faults.
For example, upsets in module m2 in domain two (second row) and m3 in
domain one (first row) will break a traditional TMR system, whereas it will
get successfully masked in a system with partitioned TMR.
In FPGA configuration bitstream, a bit that is important for the func-
tionality of a design is categorized as a critical bit. Using the component
characterization library [16], the number of essential bits, also known as po-
tentially critical bits to implement each component (adder, multiplier, etc.)
in a target FPGA can be estimated. More accurate SEU susceptibility anal-
ysis can be performed using the fault injection techniques [17, 18], however,
for first-order worst-case estimation, it is valid to assume that all the es-
sential bits are considered as critical bits. In [10, 19], authors demonstrated
how rescheduling of data-flow graphs can help to optimize the performabil-
ity, and also showed the use of Erlang distribution for accurate modeling of
scrubbing technique. In these works, to facilitate the early analysis, authors
used the concept of characterization library [16]. In our proposed approach,
we use the characterization library to calculate the failure rate of the TMR
domains. It is worth mentioning that the proposed methodology is generic
enough to be used with a different characterization library with more precise
and accurate data (from radiation experts), without any major changes.
There are three main techniques to analyze SEU sensitivity in ASIC or
FPGA based designs: 1) hardware testing with techniques such as particle
beams and laser testing 2) fault injection emulation or simulation; and 3)
analytical techniques. These three types of techniques are complementary,
and they are typically applied at different design flow steps. The first two
techniques are expensive in terms of cost and testing time. Moreover these
two techniques often require a completed implementations [20, 21]. On the
other hand, early analysis using analytical methods tends to be relatively
less accurate in some aspects. Nonetheless, they can provide a much bet-
ter controllability and observability, while enabling quick estimation of SEU
susceptibility analysis, without the risk of damaging the devices [22]. In ad-
dition, they can also capture features of the true test conditions that would
6
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Figure 2: TMRed version of the sample circuit
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Figure 3: The sample circuit with TMR divided into two partitions
be very hard to accurately reproduce when bombarding the circuit or while
performing fault injection. Analytical estimation traditionally provides in-
formation at an earlier stage in the design cycle compared to the other two
techniques.
Both academia and industry have heavily studied reliability and avail-
ability prediction of TMR. The effectiveness of different TMR schemes im-
plemented with a different level of granularity has been evaluated experimen-
tally (using beam test) and reported in [23]. In [24], authors proposed an
analytical model for systems with TMR, TMR with EDAC and TMR with
scrubbing. They discuss the Markov modeling of these techniques through-
out the paper, however, frequent voting or partitioning was not addressed.
In [25], authors present a design flow to scrub each domain in a TMR inde-
pendently to maximize the availability. In their approach, each partition is
scrubbed on-demand when required. Since TMR is very expensive in terms
of area and power, in [26] authors show TMR can be implemented only on
selected portions of a design to reduce cost. Even though some level of re-
liability is sacrificed in this approach (compared to the approach where the
whole system can be triplicated), in terms of area constraint, this tool may
maximize the reliability. The work in [4] proposes a reliability model for
partitioned TMR systems, but only for designs with equal sized partitions.
Also, the possible failure of voters was not considered in any of the works
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mentioned above.
A probabilistic model checking based approach for evaluating redundancy-
based software system was proposed in [27]. The effect of domain cross-
ing event and how to insert the voter cleverly in a hardware design was
demonstrated in [5]. In this work, the authors analyzed different partition-
ing schemes for the same design, and using the fault injection technique finds
the optimal number of TMR partitions suitable for that design. Our work
contrast all of these related works mentioned above. The proposed models
can handle the effect of both SCUs and DCUs on designs, irrespective of
the partition’s size. In addition, the proposed model also considers the voter
failures based on which optimal partitioning can be obtained.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Probabilistic Model Checking
Model checking [28] is a well-established formal verification technique
used to verify the correctness of finite-state systems. Given a formal model
of the system to be verified in terms of labelled state transitions and the
properties to be verified in terms of temporal logic, the model checking al-
gorithm exhaustively and automatically explores all the possible states in
a system to verify if the property is satisfiable or not. Probabilistic model
checking deals with systems that exhibit stochastic behaviour and is based
on the construction and analysis of a probabilistic model of the system. We
make use of CTMCs, having both transition and state labels, to perform
stochastic modelling.
Definition 1. The tuple C = (S, s0,TL, L,R) defines a CTMC which is
composed of a set of states S, an initial state s0 ∈ S, a finite set of transition
labels TL, a labelling function L : S → 2AP which assigns to each state s ∈ S
a subset of the set of atomic propositions AP which are valid in s and the
transition rate matrix R : S × S → R≥0. The rate R(s, s′) defines the delay
before which a transition between states s and s′ takes place. If R(s, s′) 6= 0
then the probability that a transition between the states s and s′ is defined as
1− e−R(s,s′)t where t is time. No transitions will trigger if R(s, s′) = 0.
Remark 1. We allow self-loops in our CTMC model, and according to
Definition 1, self-loops at state s are possible and are modeled by having
R(s, s) > 0. The inclusion of self-loops neither alters the transient nor the
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steady-state behavior of the CTMC, but allows the usual interpretation of
Linear-Time Temporal (LTL) operators (we refer the interested reader to [29]
for more details about the syntax and semantics of LTL) like the next step
(X ) that we will exploit in Section 5 to check the correctness of the model.
In the Probabilistic model checking approach using CTMCs, properties
are usually expressed in some form of extended temporal logic such as Con-
tinuous Stochastic Logic (CSL), a stochastic variant of the well-known Com-
putational Tree Logic (CTL) [28].
A CSL formula Φ defined over a CTMC M is one of the form:
Φ ::= true | a | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | S./p(Φ) | P./p(φ)
φ ::= XΦ | ΦUΦ | ΦU≤tΦ
where a ∈ AP is an atomic propositions, p ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ R>0 and ./∈ {<,≤
,≥, >}. Each Φ is known as a state formula and each φ is known as a path
formula.
The detailed syntax and semantics of CSL can be found in [14]. In CSL,
S./ p(Φ) asserts that the steady-state probability for a Φ state meets the
boundary condition ./ p. On the other hand, P./ p(φ) asserts that the prob-
ability measure of the paths satisfying φ meets the bound given by ./ p.
The meaning of the temporal operator U and X is standard (same as in
LTL). The temporal operator U≤t is the real-time invariant of U . Temporal
operators like always (), eventually (♦) and their real-time variants (≤t
and ♦≤t) can also be derived from the CSL semantics. Below, we show some
illustrative examples with their natural language translations:
1. P≥0.99[♦ complete] - “The probability of the system eventually completing
its execution successfully is at least 0.99”.
2. S≤10−9 [Failure] - “In the long run, the probability that a failure condition
can occur is less than or equal to 10−9 ”.
In the PRISM property specification language P, S, G, F, X and U op-
erators are used to refer to the P ,S,,♦,X and U operator. In addi-
tion, PRISM also supports the expression P =?[φ] and S =?[Φ] in order
to compute the actual probability of the formula φ and Φ being satisfied.
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Figure 4: Proposed methodology
PRISM also allows the use of customized properties using the filter opera-
tor: filter(op, prop, states), where op represents the filter operator (such as
forall, print, min, max, etc.), prop represents the PRISM property and states
(optional) represents the set of states over which to apply the filter.
4. Proposed Methodology
Figure 4 presents our proposed methodology. It starts from the high-level
functional description of the system being designed, formulated in C/C++.
The DFG is then extracted using the GAUT [30] tool. The DFG extraction
part from a C/C++ code and the use of component characterization library is
inspired from our previous work [11]. Once the DFG is extracted, depending
on the resource, performance or area constraint for hardware implementa-
tion, it can be scheduled using the appropriate scheduling algorithm. Since
scheduling is out of the scope of this work, we assume a fully parallel imple-
mentation of the DFG for high performance. However, it is worth mentioning
that the methodology will work irrespective of the scheduling approach.
Depending on the number and the size of partitions defined by the user,
each domain in each partition can be represented as one or a collection of
nodes (nodes in the graph represent a basic operation such as add, multiply,
etc.). Each node can be implemented as a component in the FPGA. For
clarity, we define the TMR module, domain and partitions in the context of
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Figure 5: TMR implementation of the DFG of an 8-tap FIR filter with two partitions
our paper.
Module: A module (or component) in a TMR refers to the basic operations
as they appear in the C/C++ code of the design and the obtained DFG.
The failure rate calculation of a module is based on the component char-
acterization library from [16]. As mentioned earlier, any other component
characterization library (such as those obtained by fault injection or beam
testing) can also be used with our methodology without any major changes.
Domain: A TMR domain (or branch) consists of one or more modules. An
unpartitioned TMR will have three replicated domains, whereas a partitioned
TMR will have three redundant domains in each partition. Based on this
fact, each domain in the same partition has an equal failure rate. In con-
trast, domains from different partitions may have equal or different failure
rates depending on the size of partitions. Since the input of each domain
is connected to the output of a voter from the previous partition (it is well
known that if communication between systems is a single line it becomes a
single point failure that can be avoided by triplicated wires carrying the 2 or
more out of 3 code), hence the failure rate of a domain can be expressed as:
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λdomain =
k∑
i=1
λi + λvoter (1)
where, k is the total number of modules in a domain, λi is the failure rate of
module i, and λvoter is the failure rate of a voter. Note that, since there is
no voter included in the first partition, hence λvoter = 0 for the domains of
first partition. The last three voters voting on the final output also can be
modeled (with an extra partition) using Equation 1 by replacing
∑k
i=1 λi = 0.
Partition: A TMR partition refers to the logical partitioning of the TMRed
design. Each partition may have equal or unequal size. Voters are inserted
after each partition to vote on the output from the domains. Since in a
partition a domain is replicated three times, hence the upset rate of a (fully
operational) partition is equal to 3 ∗ λdomain.
For illustration, in Figure 5 the partitioning of a DFG representing an 8-
tap FIR filter is shown. All the domains in partition-1 have four multipliers
and three adders. On the other hand, each of the domains that are part
of partition-2 contains four multipliers, four adders and three voters. The
failure rate for a module is calculated using the following equation:
λmodule = λbit ×Number of critical bits
For our experiments, λbit = 7.31× 10−12 SEUs/bit/sec where λbit represents
the SEU rate for the Higher Earth Orbit, and the number of critical bits in
a module is obtained from the characterization library. It is important to
mention that an SEU can cause either an SCU or an DCU. Hence, λdomain
needs to be adjusted accordingly. The simplest way is to multiply the λdomain
with the SCU and DCU coefficient, αSCU and αDCU respectively.
Based on the calculated failure rate of each domain, the number of parti-
tions and the user defined scrub rate, a CTMC model of the system is then
built and encoded in PRISM modeling language. Different reliability and
availability properties are then verified using the PRISM model checker to
assess if the design meets its requirements based on the provided quantitative
results. If requirements are not met, the number of partitions or the scrub
frequency is then modified, and the analysis is performed again.
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4.1. Formal Modeling of partitioned TMR
We start with formalizing individual TMR partitions, and then show how
to construct the whole partitioned system. A system with N partitions can
be defined by a set:
P = {P1, P2, ...., PN}
Here each Pi ∈ P represents a TMR partition. Each of these partitions
are prone to SCUs. However, as mentioned earlier an SEU can flip two
or more bits simultaneously in the FPGA configuration bitstream, inducing
MCUs in TMR partitions. This situation is more common in a harsh ra-
dioactive environment such as in outer space. As mentioned earlier, in this
paper we limit our modeling to Double-Cell Upsets (DCUs). Also, for the
proposed models, we consider the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 : For the SCU model, each domain in the TMR may fail in-
dependently. The time-to-failure due to a configuration bit flip(s) (either
inducing an SCU or DCU) is exponentially distributed. The exponential
distribution is commonly used to model the reliability of systems where the
failure rate is constant. The scrub interval is assumed to follow an exponen-
tial distribution as well, with a rate, µ = 1/τ , where τ represents the scrub
interval. It is also possible to approximate the deterministic scrub interval
using the Erlang distribution as shown in [19, 31].
Assumption 2 : The design employs the blind scrubbing technique [32, 33].
Blind scrubbing is a very popular and reliable scrubbing strategy that re-
quires no additional detection algorithm before fixing the configuration mem-
ory upsets.
As according to the fault-free design structure, there is no electrical node
in the logical netlist stemming from one domain that is re-converging in an-
other domain, the domains are physically independent, except if a set of
flipped configuration bits (one or more than one) introduce a short between
two nets belonging to two distinct domains. This is a physical design issue
with the FPGA and how it is placed and routed. We can either neglect this
possibility as its occurrence probability is expected to be low, or do careful
physical design such that the probability of the event becomes negligible. The
MCU modeled in the paper considers the scenario where a single SEU may
13
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Figure 6: Markov model of TMR with repair
cause a double-bit upset causing two domains to fail simultaneously. How-
ever, for SCUs this is not generally the case (subject to the above discussion).
Hence, according to assumption 1, domains should fail independently (since
they are structurally independent). Since failure of a single or multiple mod-
ule (component) in the same domain can lead to the domain failure, hence
the failure rate of a domain is equivalent to the summation of the number of
essential bits from all the modules in that domain (as shown in Equation 1).
4.1.1. Modeling of Single-Cell Upsets (SCUs)
Each TMR partition Pi ∈ P which is prone to SCUs can be described as a
CTMC.
Definition 2 (SCU-prone partition model). An SCU prone ith TMR par-
tition is defined by a CTMCMscui = (Sscu, s0,TLscu, Lscu,Rscu), where Sscu =
{3, 2, 1}, s0 = {3}, TLscu = {scu1, scu2, perform scrub}, L(3) = {operational},
L(2) = {degraded}, L(1) = {failed} and
Rscu =
R(1, 1) R(1, 2) R(1, 3)R(2, 1) R(2, 2) R(2, 3)
R(3, 1) R(3, 2) R(3, 3)
 =
 0 0 µ2λ 0 µ
0 3λ µ

Figure 6 shows an SCU prone TMR partition model with scrubbing. We
removed the state labels from the figure and the transition labels are specified
inside square brackets ([ ]) for clarity. Each node in the model denotes the
current state of a domain in that specific partition: state 3 (operational)
represents the state in which all domains are operating correctly (all the
modules are fault-free), state 2 (degraded) represents a state where one out
of three domains is operating incorrectly (in one of the domains at least one
of the modules is faulty), but the output is still not erroneous, and state 1
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(failed) represents a failure state in which two or more domains are operating
incorrectly (more than one module is faulty in two or more domains). Since
it is a TMR system, 2 out of 3 domains need to be working at a time.
In this model, µ represents the scrub rate. Note that, since we consider
periodic blind scrub for this paper, the whole system gets scrubbed period-
ically. This is reflected in the model by the perform scurb transition with
the scrub rate µ (irrespective of its current state).
From state 3, the system can move to state 2 if it encounters an SEU
with the scu1 transition and the rate of this transition is 3 ∗ λdomain. From
state 2, the system has two options: (1) the system can get scrubbed and go
back to state 3; or, (2) another module in a fault-free domain of the TMR
can fail — which will lead the system to state 1 with a transition label scu2
and transition rate 2∗λ. Once the system enters the state 1, which is a failed
state, it will remain in that state until the system gets scrubbed eventually
and comes back to state 3 with the scrub rate µ. Since in our modeling, each
TMR partition is modeled as a separate CTMC that is equivalent to the
model shown in Figure 6, this allows us to model systems with either equal
or unequal sized partitions based on the fact that failure rate of a partition is
reflected in its CTMC model. Once all the partitions are modeled as separate
CTMCs, we construct the model of the overall partitioned scrubbed-TMR
system from the parallel composition [34] of those CTMCs.
Msystem =M1 ‖ M2 ‖ ....MN
Definition 3 (Parallel composition). Given two CTMCsM1 = (S1, s01,TL1, L1,R1)
and M2 = (S2, s02,TL2, L2,R2), the parallel composition of M1 and M2 is
the CTMCM =M1||M2 = (S1×S2, (s01, s02),TL1∪TL2, L1∪L2,R) where,
R =

s1
α,λ1−−→s′1 and s2 α,λ2−−→s′2
(s1,s2)
α,λ1×λ2−−−−−→(s′1,s′2)
, if TL1 = TL2 = α(Full synchronization),
s1
α1,λ1−−−→s′1
(s1,s2)
α1,λ1−−−→(s′1,s2)
,
s2
α2,λ2−−−→s′2
(s1,s2)
α2,λ2−−−→(s1,s′2)
, otherwise(Interleaving synchronization).
and s1, s
′
1 ∈ S1, α1 ∈ TL1, α2 ∈ TL2, α ∈ TL1 ∩ TL2, R1(s1, s′1) = λ1,
s2, s
′
2 ∈ S2, R2(s2, s′2) = λ2.
Figure 7 shows the resulting composed CTMC for a TMR-scrubbed sys-
tem with two partitions where λPi and λPj represent the failure rate of left
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Figure 7: SCU Markov model of TMR with two partitions
and right partitions. Transition labels have been omitted from the figure for
clarity. We further map the states as either up or down using the following
function:
up =
{
1, if L(s)pi ∧ L(s)pi+1 ∧ ..... ∧ L(s)pN = operational ∨ degraded ,
0, otherwise.
which means that if the current state of any of the partitions are la-
belled as operational or degraded, then we classify those corresponding
states as up, otherwise down. Hence, in Figure 7, up = {4, 5, 7, 8} and
down = {0, 1, 2, 3, 6}
4.2. Modeling of Multiple-Cell Upsets (MCUs)
An SEU that causes a DCU invokes failures in multiple TMR domains
simultaneously and each of those domain may belong to the same, or to
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[scu1] [scu2]
[perform_scrub]
[perform_scrub]
[perform_scrub]
3β
[dcu1]
2β
[dcu2]
Figure 8: DCU model of TMR with repair
the separate partitions. Hence, we need to consider two cases for modeling
them: (1) DCUs in the same partition and (2) DCUs in separate partitions.
To achieve the first goal, we enhance the model presented in Figure 6 and
define them as follows:
Definition 4 (SCU and DCU prone combined model). An ith TMR par-
tition that is prone to both SCUs and DCUs is defined by a CTMC Mcombi =
(Scomb, s0,TLcomb, Lcomb,Rcomb), where Scomb = {3, 2, 1}, s0 = {3}, TLcomb =
{scu1, scu2, dcu1, dcu2, perform scrub}, L(3) = {operational}, L(2) = {degraded},
L(1) = {failed} and
Rcomb =
R(1, 1) R(1, 2) R(1, 3)R(2, 1) R(2, 2) R(2, 3)
R(3, 1) R(3, 2) R(3, 3)
 =
 0 0 µ2λ+ 2β 0 µ
3β 3λ µ

We refer to this model as the “combined model”, since it captures both
SCUs and DCUs (in the same partition) .
Let us first consider the case where a DCU causes failure of two domains,
but in the same partition. The parameter β represents the DCU rate of a
domain pair, which corresponds to a situation causing a domain failure while
also causing failure of another domain in the same partition (that would
happen if an ionizing particle first hit a domain and then induces an ionized
track spreading to a second domain to also make it fail). For instance, let
us consider the DCU case where domain 1 fails first in a partition and then
causes a failure to domain 2 of the same partition with a rate γ (as paticle
upsets take place on a very short time scale, the two domains are assumed
to fail at the same clock cycle). The reverse could also happen, which means
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Figure 9: Model for synchronization of DCUs in separate domain (two partitions)
domain 2 can fail while invoking a failure to domain 1 with a rate γ. So, for
the pair domain 1 and 2, the rate at which either of them fails in the same
cycle as to the other one is γ + γ. As defined, the two considered events
are disjoint and their rates can be summed accurately. In our model, we
combined and express them together, which means β = γ + γ. Similarly, we
have two more domain pairs to consider in a TMR partition (irrespective of
their order since we combine the rates), which are domain 1 and domain 3,
and domain 2 and 3. In that context, Figure 8 shows the Markov model of
a TMR partition that can handle both SCUs and DCUs. Compared to the
SCU partition model, the main changes are two new transitions, from state 3
to state 1 ([dcu1]) and from state 2 to state 1 ([dcu2]). The [dcu1] transition
with the rate 3β represents the phenomenon that at least one of the DCUs
in one of the three domain pairs (in the same partition) will cause a TMR
failure. Similarly, the [dcu2] transition also represents another domain pair
failure in the same partition.
The second case models a DCU affecting two separate partitions (in ad-
dition to the DCUs affecting in a same partition). This case is significantly
more complex, and to model this we need to introduce new transitions (in
addition to those defined in Definition 4) in separate partitions . It requires
the use of pairwise synchronization (via parallel composition as defined in
Definition 3) of associated transitions in different partitions to represent a
simultaneous failure due to a DCU in different partitions.
Figure 9 shows how we extend the “combined model” (that was shown in
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Figure 8) for incorporating DCUs in distributed domains (shown by dotted
arrows) for the case where a design has two partitions (corresponds to the
layout shown in Figure 5). In this extended model, we represent DCUs in
the same partition using the previously defined parameter β and DCUs in
separate partitions using another parameter β1. To define β1, we consider
that domain 1 in Pi can fail while invoking another failure of domain 1,
domain 2 or domain 3 in partition Pj with a rate γ1 + γ1 + γ1. In our
model, this is represented as β1 = γ1 + γ1 + γ1. So the rate at which
the three domains in partition Pi will fail due to a DCU while causing a
failure to a domain in partition Pj is 3β1. Similarly, the rate that either of
the three domains in partition Pj will fail due to a DCU while invoking a
failure to a domain in partition Pi is also 3β1. In Figure 9, the transition
[Pi dcu1] and [Pj dcu1] represent a DCU in partition Pi and Pj respectively
(DCUs in the same partition). In contrast, the [dcuij] and [dcuji] transitions
(triggers based on the current state) in partition Pi is synchronized using
the same transition label ([dcuij] and [dcuji]) in partition Pj with the rate 1
(refer to Remark 2), which depicts DCUs in two separate partitions. Let us
consider a case where both partitions have three operational domains, hence
both Markov chains are in state 3. For a DCU in separate partitions, either
encountered by a domain in partition Pi or Pj, both Markov chains will move
to state 2 simultaneously (this is synchronized using the same label [dcuij]
in both partitions). If the partition Pj is in state 2, and partition Pi is in
state 3, then the left Markov chain will move to state 2 and the right Markov
chain will move to state 1 simultaneously, and this has been synchronized
using the same label [dcuji].
Remark 2. Please note that, for full synchronization, as in Definitions 3,
the rate of a synchronous transition is defined as the product of the rates for
each transition. We need to synchronize the scrub transition “perform scrub”
between the TMR partition models. For example, the intended scrub rate
(µ) is specified in full for the scrub transitions in one of the partitions (in the
first partition as shown in Figure 9), and the rate of other scrub transition(s)
in rest of the partition models (in second partition as shown in Figure 9) are
specified as 1. Similarly we synchronize transitions for modeling DCUs in
separate domains.
Figure 10 shows the combined model after parallel composition of the
partitions (refer to Definition 3) that encapsulates the effect of both: SCUs
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Figure 10: Combined Markov model of TMR with two partitions
and DCUs (same and separate domains). In this model, βPi and βPj represent
the DCU rate (DCUs in the same partition) of a domain in the first and
second partition respectively. The parameter β1Pi and β1Pj represent DCUs
in respective separate partitions.
For example, in state 8 both partitions are working fine. However, if one
of the domains in the partitions encounters an SCU, then the system can
move to either state 5 or state 7, depending on the location of the domain.
Also, if the system is in state 8, and a DCU occurs in any domain of either
partitions (DCU in separate partitions), it will trigger another domain failure
in the other partition simultaneously. This leads to a path from state 8 to
state 4 with the rate 3 ∗β1Pj + 3 ∗β1Pi. The rest of the two transitions from
state 8 to state 2 and state 6 represent DCUs in the same partition with
associated rates.
For our analysis, we developed Markov models for four design options,
starting from no partition2 up to eight partitions. The complexity of these
models in terms of total number of states and total number of transitions
is shown in Table 1. As observed from Table 1, with increasing number of
partitions, modeling of TMR gets very complicated since increasing number
2no partition (unpartitioned TMR) actually refers to 1 partition
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Table 1: Model construction statistics
No. of No. of No. of transitions No. of transitions
partitions states (SCU only model) (combined model)
1 3 5 11
2 9 26 36
4 81 362 578
8 6561 47858 129506
of transitions are required to model synchronized DCUs in separate domains.
We were able to keep such modeling manageable since we define each parti-
tions separately as modules in the PRISM language and utilize the PRISM
model checking tool for parallel composition of modules (representing TMR
partitions) for generating the complete model for analysis. Please note that
modules in PRISM language and modules in a TMR should not be confused.
We refer to [35] for details about the PRISM modeling language. Similarly,
N partitions can be modeled using our methodology by adding new modules
to the PRISM code.
5. Quantitative Analysis of an FIR Filter
Filters are commonly used in digital communication systems for different
purposes, such as for equalization, signal separation, noise reduction and so
on. Communication is a fundamental issue for all space-borne applications
ranging from satellites to unmanned missions. That is why digital filters have
an important role to play for such systems [36]. To illustrate the applicability
of our approach, we analyze an 8-bit 64-tap FIR filter (the target platform
is a Xilinx Virtex-5 SRAM-based FPGA) using both, the SCU model and
the combined model for a different number of partitions. FIR filters [37] are
widely used in space applications for their excellent stability and simplicity
of their implementation according to the given response. An N-tap discrete
finite impulse response (FIR) filter can be expressed as follows:
y[n] =
N−1∑
i=0
x[n− i] · h[i]
x[ ], y[ ] and h[ ] are the input samples, output samples and the filter coef-
ficients respectively. All experiments are conducted for a mission time of 1
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Figure 11: SCU Reliability
month. Since SEUs can cause both SCUs or DCUs, for the combined model,
it was assumed that 99% (αSCU = 0.99) of the SEUs will cause SCUs and
1% (αDCU = 0.01) of them will cause DCUs (with another added assumption
that β = β1). Since the model is parametric, any other values for scaling
the SCU and DCU rates can be used. Also, we use λvoter = 0 for the first
few experiments, and then introduce a non-zero failure rate for the voters
(using Equation 1) to evaluate its impact on our models. We analyze four
design options (as shown in Table 1) using our methodology. We use the
PRISM model checker version 4.1 to analyze the reliability and availability
properties for each of them.
Before analyzing the model quantitatively, we verify the following LTL style
properties (Recall Remark 1) to check the correctness of the model:
Correctness Property: filter(forall, P>0 [X oper]) - “From any reach-
able state, it is possible to reach the oper state in the next step with a
probability greater than 0 ”.
Note that, as mentioned earlier in the preliminary section, blind scrub-
bing periodically reconfigures the FPGA, which does not require any fault
detection. This sets the requirement (specified as the property above) that
the system should be repaired irrespective of its failures, i.e. will be scrubbed
even in the oper state, which justifies the self-loop in our model. While ver-
ifying, PRISM returned true, which means that the correctness property
hold in our model.
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5.1. Analysis
Figure 11 shows the relationship between the reliability and number of
partitions in the design for different scrub intervals using the SCU model.
Reliability of a system (or component) is defined as the probability that the
system performs correctly for a given period of time, from zero (t0) to t1, given
that the system or the component was functioning correctly at t0. In PRISM,
this property can be formalized in CSL as P=?[G[0,T] operational], T =
1 month, and we evaluate this property for different scrub intervals starting
from 15 minutes up to 4 hours. For all the design options with different
scrub intervals, the reliability decreases when the scrub interval increases.
However, designs with more partitions show significant improvements in re-
liability, even with the same scrub interval. For example, if the scrubbing
interval is 15 minutes, the design with no partition has a reliability of 0.65
only. In contrast, the design with two, four and eight partitions has a relia-
bility of 0.81, 0.90 and 0.94 respectively. TMR increases the area and power
consumption by a factor of 300% as a result of replications. More frequent
scrub in such cases will consume more power that might not be appropriate
for most space applications. For such circumstances, increasing the number
of partitions can offer a good solution instead of a more frequent scrub strat-
egy. For example, if the designer is targeting a reliability higher than 0.80,
and if the design has no partition (or fewer partitions), then the designer may
consider adopting a more frequent scrubbing strategy (less than an hour, in
order of seconds or milliseconds) to meet some requirements. Instead of
adding such power burden on the system, the designer may adopt TMR with
2, 4 or 8 partitions, which will require scrubbing once per 15 minutes (thus
reducing power consumption) and will also meet the requirement. Note that
the design option with eight partitions provides a reliability of 0.8 even for a
delayed scrub of 1 hour. Using this approach a designer can determine the
number of partitions required to meet the design requirements for a given
scrub rate or vice versa.
Availability is defined as the ratio of time the system or component op-
erates correctly (system uptime) to its entire mission time. Using the SCU
model, Figure 12 shows the availability of the design for different scrub in-
tervals and a different number of partitions. In PRISM, this property can
be formalized in CSL as R{"up time"}=? [C<=T]/T, T = 1 month. The
design with no partition offers an availability of 4 nines (0.9999) for the scrub
interval of 15 minutes which drops up to 1 nine (0.97) with increased scrub
interval of 4 hours. Compared to this, all the other options with TMR parti-
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Figure 12: SCU Availability
Figure 13: Combined Reliability
tioning offer improved availability. For instance, for a scrub interval of three
hours, the design with no partition offers only 98% availability, whereas the
rest of the design options with partitioning offers availabilities of more than
99%. Most of the communication satellites target more than 99% availability.
In such cases, if the power constraint restricts the designer not to increase the
scrub interval, then increasing the number of partitions may offer a solution.
For the second part of our analysis, we evaluated the same reliability and
availability properties using the combined model for all the design options
with two, four and eight partitions. The results are shown in Figure 13 and
Figure 14. We observe that even for the combined model, with increasing
number of partitions, the reliability and availability of the design increases.
Interestingly, increasing the number of partitions has a small effect on the
value of the availability when the design employs frequent scrubbing, how-
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Figure 14: Combined Availability
ever, it should be noted that approaching 1 even by a small amount can be
extremely difficult, and the improvement of availability is not well reflected
on a linear scale. In contrast, increasing the number of partitions improves
the availability dramatically for the cases where the scrub interval in com-
paratively longer. From this, we can conclude that our observation for the
SCU only model also holds for the combined model.
5.2. Observation
A major observation from these analysis is that when the scrub inter-
val is smaller (frequent scrub), the number of partitions plays a major role
increasing the reliability of a system. However, even for a delayed scrub,
the improvement is noticeable enough. In other words, the graphs show a
trend that to meet the designer’s reliability goal, if the number of partitions
(which means smaller domains) is increased, less frequent scrub will be re-
quired. In contrast, fewer partitions (larger domain size) will require more
frequent scrubs to meet a target reliability requirement. For the availability,
the number of partitions plays a significant role for longer scrub intervals. For
frequent scrub intervals, the number of partitions increases the availability to
a minimal level, but for longer scrub intervals, the improvement of availabil-
ity with the number of partitions is quite significant. Such early analysis on
the high-level design description will allow a designer to perform the analysis
before the actual implementation of the system considering the design con-
straints such as power. Using such methodology a designer can find better
trade-offs between the number of partitions and the required scrub interval
that will meet the design requirements, and also reduce the design effort,
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Figure 15: Impact of voter failure on the SCU model
Figure 16: Impact of voter failure on the combined model
time and cost.
5.3. Impact of the voter failure
So far, we evaluated the proposed models assuming that TMR voters
are not prone to failure. To illustrate the capability of our model in this
section we introduce a non-zero failure rate (λvoter = 5× 10−3 per hour) for
voters and evaluate both the SCU and combined model for two, four and
eight partitions. The obtained results are shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16.
Interestingly, this time we observe a trade-off, and the obtained results clearly
contrast the results obtained earlier with non-zero voter failure rate. For the
SCU model, TMR with four partitions shows the best reliability compared
to the options with two and eight partitions, unless the scrub interval is very
long (for example if the scrub interval is more than 3 hours, then all the three
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TMR options offer a similar reliability). However, for the combined model,
the reliability of the TMR with two partitions beats the other TMR versions.
This finding is very interesting, since it shows a reversal of trends compared
to what we observed when the TMR voters were assumed to be fault-free
(in which more partition was always better). Also, when the scrub interval
is more than an hour for the combined model, the reliabilities of TMR with
two and four partitions become very close to each other. It means that if a
designer needs to adopt a very long scrub interval, then TMR with two or
four partitions, can both be a good choice for the design. In contrast, if it is
possible to adopt a faster scrubbing (interval less than an hour), then TMR
with two partitions is the proper choice.
Design of a fault-tolerant voter has been an important and active research
area for many years [38, 39]. Based on the choice of the voter to implement
with the TMR partitions, it is straightforward to use our proposed approach
for evaluating the relationship between the scrub interval and the number of
TMR partitions knowing the specific choice of a voter and associated failure
rate by changing only the parameters of the model.
5.4. Scalability
As shown in Table 1, when increasing number of partitions, the number
of states also increase. The relationship between the number of partitions
N and the number of states Stotal can be expressed as Stotal = 3
N , where
N ≥ 1. PRISM model checker includes multiple model checking engines,
many of which are based on symbolic implementations (using binary deci-
sion diagrams and their extensions). These engines enable the probabilistic
verification of models of up to 1010 states (on average, PRISM handles mod-
els with up to 107 − 108 states). So based on this fact, with the proposed
approach we can model up to 16 partitions and this is due to the limitation
of the PRISM tool.
It is worth mentioning that in order to analyze more larger of partitions,
it is possible to reduce the state space of the probabilistic models prior to
verification. A variety of techniques has been recently developed includ-
ing symmetry reduction, bisimulation minimisation and abstraction. Among
these bisimulation (also known as lumping)[40, 41] is of particular interest for
our future work, since it preserves widely used probabilistic temporal logics.
PRISM also features a variety of advanced techniques such as abstraction
refinement and symmetry reduction. PRISM also supports approximate/s-
tatistical model checking through a discrete event simulation engine. So
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considering the capability of the PRISM model checker, it is also possible to
analyze systems with larger number of partitions using our methodology.
6. Conclusion and Future Works
We presented the formal modeling and analysis of single-cell and multiple-
cell upsets using a methodology based on the probabilistic model checking
technique. This methodology aims to analyze the relationship between the
number of TMR partitions, scrub interval and mission time. Increasing the
number of TMR partitions allows to reduce the frequency of scrubbing, which
results in less energy consumption. However, based on the voter failure rate,
it is possible to find the optimal number of partitions. Using the proposed
methodology, designers can assess the number of partitions, or the scrub
frequency required to meet the design requirement at early design stages. To
demonstrate our approach, we have shown the results of our analysis for a
64-tap FIR filter case study. The results showed how the increased number
of partitions enable less frequent scrubs and vice-versa, and also we were able
to find the optimal number of partitions for both: the SCU and the combined
model. Such an early analysis will add more confidence to the design and
may reduce the overall design cost, time, and effort. However, since the
PRISM modeling is not automated, this restricts us to do so. In the future,
we will work to overcome this limitation. It is also worth mentioning that
with the decrease of the transistor size, three or more bit upsets are also not
uncommon these days. This will be addressed in our future work. Another
interesting future work for us will be to include the partial reconfiguration
(read-back scrubbing) in our model and to explore the effect of unreliable
voters in the design partitions.
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